

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

WINNING THE HEARTS AND MINDS:  
PROVIDING THE BASIC NEEDS FIRST

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## ABSTRACT

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The physiological conditions that exist in a country must be analyzed to determine not only the level of effort required to rebuild, but what to rebuild. The “way” or concept of analyzing and providing for the basic needs of the people must be a part of the strategic plan. Using Iraq as an example, if the basic needs framed under the lens within Maslow’s hierarchy of needs are identified and this concept is incorporated into the U.S. Strategy then nation building can be better executed. From a strategic perspective this is important not only because it fosters stability, but can lead to more security, and truly win the hearts and minds campaign. Implementation of this concept will prioritize planning, save military lives, and result in a lower rebuilding costs. This paper proposes a U.S. policy option concerning stability operations that focuses on the provision of basic human necessities first.



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## WINNING THE HEARTS AND MINDS: PROVIDING THE BASIC NEEDS FIRST

To bring a war, or one of its campaigns, to a successful close requires a thorough grasp of national policy. On that level strategy and policy coalesce: the commander-in-chief is simultaneously a statesman.<sup>1</sup>

- Carl von Clausewitz

The national military objectives are detailed in the National Military Strategy (NMS) and include the ability to swiftly defeat adversaries, win decisively, and conduct stability operations.<sup>2</sup>

With regard to stability operations, the NMS specifically states:

Winning decisively will require synchronizing and integrating major combat operations, stability operations and significant post-conflict interagency operations to establish conditions of stability and security favorable to the United States. The Joint Force must be able to transition from major combat operations to stability operations and conduct those operations simultaneously. At the operational level, military post-conflict operations will integrate conflict termination objectives with diplomatic, economic, financial, intelligence, law enforcement and information efforts.<sup>3</sup>

The NMS defines stability operations as something that can be concurrent with major combat operations and post combat operations. The NMS details this task to allow the combatant commanders the ability to assess military and strategic risk. An analysis of the ends-ways-means of this policy concerning current stability operations in post war Iraq will provide future options to better ensure success, mitigate risks, and ensure policy sustainment.<sup>4</sup>

As highlighted in the current war in Iraq, the United States has had great difficulty in concurrent peace support operations: nation building and peacekeeping (phase IV operations). This is evident in the media and was also highlighted during President Bush's presidential debates with Senator Kerry. The President had been accused of not providing clear cut objectives in the war, of over-spending, and of overextending America's troops. The National Security Strategy (NSS) promulgates the policy to protect and defend the U.S. against threats to the nation's well being and to decisively defeat any adversary if deterrence fails. Providing a secure environment in Iraq will allow for a more effective reconstruction effort. An analysis of the national reconstruction and nation building policy objectives permits an understanding of these overlooked and simple needs of the people. This provides a better opportunity for phase IV operational success. Stronger national policy objectives will result in better planned reconstruction efforts that can truly win the hearts and minds of the people.

Unfortunately, in the Iraq operation, the U.S. defense planning system did not work. Indeed, it failed badly in the planning for the aftermath of Saddam's fall from power. The first three phases of the operation, including the buildup, initial

preparation actions (largely by covert teams), and the main air-ground thrust, were impressive. But what is now commonly called Phase IV was handled so badly that its downsides have now largely outweighed the virtues of the earlier parts of the operation.<sup>5</sup>

The critical American failure with the stability effort resulted from the inadequate physical security for the Iraqi people and the failure to provide the basic survival needs first and foremost. A course of action will focus on a concept that can offer success to the stability effort, which in turn, sustains the policy. Because the commander is the planner and ultimate statesman with respect to the combination of strategy and policy, it is imperative that a balance is achieved in the diplomatic, military, economic, and informational elements of national power.<sup>6</sup> Nation building can be better executed if the basic needs concept within Maslow's hierarchy of needs are employed and incorporated into the U.S. Strategy.

This paper will present a policy background, review the challenges to the current strategy of the U.S. policy in Iraq, present a concept option for strategy improvement, offer thought as to the true roots of insurgency, a recommendation, and conclusion.

## **BACKGROUND**

The failure of stability efforts in Iraq can threaten U.S. national security. National focus on this threat is high because of the explosive potential it retains in undermining U.S. homeland security. Unlike the central front in Europe in the Cold War, in the Middle East there are multiple and overlapping security threats for each state in the region.<sup>7</sup> On a global basis, the U.S. military objective (ends) is to prevail against adversaries. The military concepts (ways) are three-fold: swiftly defeat adversaries in overlapping campaigns, win decisively to achieve more enduring results, and conduct stability operations. The concepts (ways) are where the policies have had difficulty in the current conflict in Iraq regarding stability operations. This is possibly the result of a poor appraisal of the "how" to employ the means to meet the ends (stated objective).<sup>8</sup> The military has swiftly defeated adversaries in Iraq. The win was declared in phase I of operations; yet lasting results have been slow as the media and public dissect the conflict escalation and daily loss of life in these areas. Iraq successfully held elections and this may or may not prove to reinforce enduring results. Additionally, the conduct of U.S. stability operations has been imperiled by insurgency.

The first week in April of 2003 saw U.S. troops oust the regime of Saddam Hussein with the proclaimed end to the combat phase of the war effort occurring just shortly after the toppling of the dictator's statue. Celebration in the streets of Iraq immediately followed with the new freedom. Early opinion polls proved that the Iraqis had a willingness to tolerate U.S. troops as a



necessary means to ensure stability, and that there was a general happiness that Saddam was gone.<sup>9</sup> This opportunity of winning the hearts and minds of Iraqi cooperation was lost and would not be recovered in the short term. The reestablishment of the political and economic order was lacking within the “how” of Washington’s plan. Criticism and frustration were evident on the ground, and the need for an effective reconstruction strategy plan intensified.<sup>10</sup> In future wars, an effective reconstruction strategy is paramount because of its implications for future governance operations.

A key element to this strategy is the mitigation of fear through security for the Iraqi people. Using the Clausewitzian Trinity of the government, the military, and the people, winning the hearts and minds of the people is proportionate to how quickly it can restore security in the short term, restore an interim and legitimate government, and develop an indigenous military force. The destruction of the government (Saddam Hussein) and the military coupled with a lack of security for the people have led and will continue to lead to a failed state and a hostile environment in which to sustain efforts. “How” to perform security for the Iraqi reconstruction effort or even future efforts is gravely important in this context because it is the concept of basic needs first that will make or break stability efforts. Since this has been incorporated into the U.S. Army’s role, that service will have to balance the role of combat and civilian rebuilding efforts. This will require the Army’s consideration of existing definitions and doctrines. With two pillars of the trinity in need of reconstruction, the government and the military, the how of security is paramount. Providing for the basic needs first for the remaining pillar of the triad, the people, is a key concept to future strategy and policy.

Many of the Iraqis were accustomed to the iron fist of a dictator. The defeat of this dictator led to the hope that the U.S. would quickly repair and restore not only the war damage, but the predictability in their lives. Nasiriyah has become a great yardstick for measuring the mood of the Iraqi people. The U.S. forces expected a friendly reception after the war and certainly got it. But as the Italian coalition forces relieved the Marines, there was a huge void in security and the Iraqis saw this as an American broken promise. The Italian forces had different priorities, and the new Iraqi police that they established was considered to be just as corrupt as the old regime.<sup>11</sup>

Residents complained that militias and political parties had deteriorated since the arrival of the Italian coalition. The people did not trust the Iraqi police and no longer felt safe. The majority of the people did not have the basic physiological needs to include clean water, food, electricity, housing, and jobs. This predicament was similar to the depressed economic areas and slums in the U.S. Many of the Iraqi people fall victim to militia groups that prey on despair

and broken will.<sup>12</sup> The cleric and militant leader Al-Sadr gained support from the poor and youth in the city. Even those that supported Al-Sadr vowed that if the Americans brought jobs and security, they would denounce support to him and to resistance against the occupation.<sup>13</sup> What began as a stability effort slowly escalated to eventual chaos and insurgency, a condition that many Iraqis believe will continue as long as Americans stay within the country.

To attack the root cause of insurgency or terrorism within a national policy and strategy is a difficult and moving target. Furthermore, regime change will not be successful without stability operations.<sup>14</sup> When President Bush declared a war on terrorism, he arguably did so to suggest that the world terror network was linked. Specifically, the U.S. saw Iraq as a threat to Gulf States if it completed its WMD programs. "By 2002 it seemed clear that the containment effort of the 1990's had failed to stop the Iraqi programs. A U.S. attack to disarm Iraq was seen as preemptive."<sup>15</sup> If regime change and a strategy of preemption is the norm, then the right planning is paramount. The U.S. military can be better prepared in future wars by developing better plans to combat the lawlessness resulting from a country's brand new freedom. Preparing for stability operations cannot be planned after the war has begun. It must be planned long before the first soldier is on the ground.<sup>16</sup> There is a clear advantage in knowing the underlying conditions of the country and people liberated. This information will lead to better planning to meet their needs.

Almost one third of the 4.4 billion people living in the developing countries do not have access to clean water.<sup>17</sup> What underlying conditions or needs should be considered in the planning process prior to conflict? This is a consideration that should have been addressed prior to the conflict in Iraq, and it is a definite advantage to capitalize on for wars in the future. The population of developing countries with access to an improved water source is 69.5 percent as compared to 48 percent in Iraq. The percentage of the population that has access to improved sanitation in developing countries is 35 percent as compared to 31 percent in Iraq.<sup>18</sup> These two facts present a case for improving underlying conditions worthy of more research. It is this very analysis that our strategy can frame under Maslow's lens to get the improved picture of the situation and allow for better planning. This planning could also influence operational decisions such as precision bombing. If it is known that there is a need for a particular resource and it is a fundamental to basic survival, then the military may choose not to destroy certain target areas so as not to exacerbate an already present poor condition.

The negative developments that are occurring in Iraq result from mistaken American policies. However, the Iraqi opinion of reconstruction still remains favorable, and there remains a widespread fear that if the U.S. leaves Iraq, the country would fall into civil war. The Iraqis

simply want the U.S. to do a better job at the stability efforts with reconstruction and security.<sup>19</sup>

Tackling these issues will provide the analysis of “how”, because the current “how”, as one analyst has noted, has proven to be problematic at best:

The United States must fundamentally reorient its security strategy. To date, U.S. forces have concentrated on chasing insurgents and protecting themselves. Although not unimportant, these pale in comparison with the need to provide basic security for the Iraqi people. Today the fear of common crime and attacks committed by those who seek to undermine the course of reconstruction are the single greatest impediments to Iraq's economic and political reconstruction...If we cannot make the Iraqis feel safe in their own streets (let alone in their own homes) they will not go to work, they will not go to the market, they will not go to the polls, they will not go to town meetings and worst of all they will begin to find another way to solve their security problems...<sup>20</sup>

The President outlines U.S. security policy in the NSS. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is responsible for the (NMS), which implements presidential guidance and provides strategic direction of the armed forces. Since the offensive maneuver of preemptive strike leading to regime change has been exercised by the Bush administration, policy makers need to plan for nation building in the final phase of operations. The current analogies to Vietnam are due to the fact that counterinsurgency and nation building efforts in Iraq are simultaneous efforts. However, very little attention has been given to the theory and practice of counterinsurgency warfare in our strategic studies journals.<sup>21</sup> The Army's Field Manual (FM)-1 discusses the framework within which the President uses employment considerations in deciding how to use military forces to pursue strategic or national objectives. The decision makers use a series of questions to determine the feasibility of a mission. If a similar framework is used to employ the forces for nation building or stability operations, then this would make an important contribution to the NSS and the NMS. The questions or options would allow policy makers to not only apply the right military force, but the proper allocation and planning of all operational phases.

In Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), it was clear that major combat operations and stability operations were happening at the same time. The U.S. had been developing a plan to invade Iraq for over a year. The plan included the extensive development of information operations, a multinational air campaign, a fire support plan, and a detailed flow of forces. The resulting inability to reestablish order, provide basic services (needs), and improve economic life negatively affected early occupation efforts and fostered the conditions to allow the development of insurgency.<sup>22</sup> There must be integrated efforts of multinational forces as well as interagency coordination. Having an exit strategy and sticking to it is important, but more important is flexibility in adjusting to situations caused by the very friction and fog of war.<sup>23</sup>

## BASIC MASLOW CONCEPT

One approach or “way” of achieving policy goals is a new concept of planning for post war conflict and concurrent nation building. The concept for this particular action is simply using the model of Abraham Maslow’s hierarchy of needs as the framework. A simple psychology application to a state has a two-fold use as it can assist both in pre-war evaluation of the enemy state and a post-war evaluation of needed infrastructure. Figure 1 highlights the model:




FIGURE 1 MASLOW'S HIERARCHY OF NEEDS

The basic premise of this model is that human beings are motivated by unsatisfied needs, and that certain lower needs must be satisfied before higher needs can be fulfilled.<sup>24</sup> According to Maslow, there are deficiency needs to be fulfilled before other (and higher) needs emerge, and these, rather than physiological hungers, dominate the individual. Once one need is satisfied, another and higher need will take its place.<sup>25</sup> A brief discussion of the five types of need will provide the basic understanding for subsequent application to phase IV planning.

Physiological needs are the very basic needs such as air, warmth, water, food, stimulation, and activity. Maslow asserts that when these are not satisfied, they are translated into sickness, irritation, pain, and discomfort. If stability operations identify and quickly bring order and reconstruction to this area, for example fresh water and electricity to homes, then concurrent security efforts can have a better chance for success. In the chaotic environment of Iraq, the failure to provide for the basic physiological needs of clean water, food, sleep, and shelter, has instigated violence and a lack of security. Once these are met, and not necessarily

in full, people can move on to other needs. By determining what specific physiological needs are available in a country, planners could better devise a plan to support and create these necessities to be successful in phase IV of an operation.

Safety needs establish stability and consistency in a chaotic world. These needs are psychological in nature. This need focuses on the security for the home and family. People need physical safety in their neighborhoods or living in a safe area away from threats. Safety needs can also motivate people to be religious. Religions can comfort with the promise of a safe and secure place when we die and leave the insecurity of this world. Safety needs also include laws in order to feel safe in our environment. Some people, particularly those in the inner cities are stuck at this level.<sup>26</sup> In Iraq, the loss of security or lack thereof in some areas created impediments to successful stability operations.

Social needs are that of love and belonging. Love needs represent the human desire to belong to clubs, churches, work groups, and gangs. We need to feel love and to be accepted by others. People need to be needed and have the love of family and friends. These feelings of belonging result in friendship, feeling of belonging, and camaraderie.<sup>27</sup> If the Physiological and safety needs can be simultaneously implemented, then social needs can be established and hearts and minds can be won.

Self-esteem needs are in two categories. First is self esteem which results from the mastery of a task. The second need is the attention and recognition that comes from others. Wanting admiration is related to the need for power. Luxuries often raise our self esteem once our lower needs are satisfied. Internal esteem needs or ego includes self respect, autonomy, achievement, and recognition.<sup>28</sup>

The pinnacle of the need theory is that of self-actualization. This is the desire to reach one's full potential. We may seek knowledge, peace, aesthetic experiences, and self-fulfillment.<sup>29</sup> This desire drives one to become all they are capable of becoming. This is where true individual potential is maximized. Here individuals seek knowledge, peace, oneness with God, and self-fulfillment.<sup>30</sup>

Although the use of Maslow's hierarchy of needs is simplistic and fundamental, it is this simplicity that contributes to the strength of this model, as it provides for ease of analysis. This model has benefited not just psychology studies, but has been applied to many modern issues. The Maslow framework is currently being used to analyze and plan in the following areas: accounting, advertising, business studies, cultural studies, communication, country studies, economics, engineering, environmental studies, labor studies, management, religious and theology, sales, and tourism.<sup>31</sup>

Maslow's assumptions for this hierarchy are that people were inherently trustworthy, self-protecting, and self-governing. He believed that humans gravitated to growth and love. Despite the continuous cycle of war, murder, and deceit, Maslow believed that violence was not the human norm. The violence and other atrocities were the result of unfulfilled human needs. He believed that the depravity of the human need caused an insecurity that forced people to defend themselves by violent means. This could easily explain the on-going violence in Iraq. It should also be noted that this hierarchy is also dynamic. One can reach a level of self-actualization and also become tired and hungry. Similarly, eating can be both physiological and social. Maslow also believed that a satisfied need no longer motivates. Once a hungry person who is desperate for food eats, then the motivation for eating does not drive them.

### **TRUE ROOTS OF INSURGENCY**

The insurgent or terrorist uses a cause to exploit and gain negative momentum from the people. If the basic needs are not met then this leaves a myriad of instability causes from which the insurgent can benefit. Anticipating or planning for these conflicts is difficult but possible at the national strategy level. The hierarchies of needs approach provides a basic lens to frame those needs of the people that have not been identified and properly planned for resolution during Phase IV of the operation. The insurgents are adaptive and shrewd and use the changing environment to their advantage. In an effort to suppress democracy, insurgents can exploit religion as the common thread to reach the masses.

What are the basic needs of the average Iraqi? Maslow's hierarchy of needs is an excellent point of reference. This is the planning key for stability operation success. This makes good sense because the average Iraqi cannot even entertain a job thought if he does not have a home, food, or water. One year before the war in Iraq, Thomas Warrick, a State Department official, directed a \$5 million dollar "Future of Iraq" project. Seventeen working groups were formed including a focus on economic matters concerned with "Public Finance, "Oil and Energy," and "Water, Agriculture, and Environment."<sup>32</sup> The groups also included Iraqi expatriots as participants. The first item in a list of recommendations from the "Water, Agriculture, and Environment" group read, "Fundamental importance of clean water supplies for Iraqis immediately after transition...Stressed importance of getting electrical grid up and running immediately—key to water systems, jobs. This could go a long way in determining Iraqis attitudes toward coalition forces."<sup>33</sup> A prescribed concept for all phase IV planning to include State Department, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and United States Central Command (CENTCOM) could benefit from the Maslow framework.

The Administration will be admired in retrospect for how much knowledge it created about the challenge it was taking on. U.S. government predictions about post war Iraq's problems have proved as accurate as the assessments of pre-war Iraq's strategic threat have proved flawed. But the Administration will be condemned for what it did with what was known. The problems the United States has encountered are precisely the ones its own experts warned against.<sup>34</sup>

During the phase IV efforts an interim government or Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) was headed by Ambassador Paul Bremer. The priority focus of the planners and the U.S. strategy was that they considered the most important need to be the establishment of government and the January elections for self-determination. This strategy as compared to Maslow's hierarchy is exactly opposite to the model. Most of the early efforts in phase IV went toward the establishment of a government and an army. At this point the only "hearts and minds" campaigns that took place were in U.S. Army Civil Affairs units by rebuilding schools and hospitals. The basic needs were not a priority and quickly became the recruiting ground for insurgency. This priority plan started at the top of the Maslow hierarchy of needs without first satisfying the lowest level needs.<sup>35</sup>

The insurgents attacked in a three-pronged strategy: infrastructure attacks, crime and coercion, and government destabilization. These attacks focused on the true center of gravity, the basic needs of the people. By destabilizing the basic physiological and safety needs, the insurgents unfortunately gained traction. The infrastructure attacks targeted electricity grids, fuel trucks, transportation, and telephone networks. These were the Iraqis' basic necessities of life (physiological needs). The rampant crime, hostage taking, protection money, convoy attacks, and theft brought made Iraqi citizens feel insecure. This is in direct conflict with supporting the need of safety. Crime activity aided the funding of the insurgency and was used to support insurgent goals.<sup>36</sup> Government attacks included the assassination and execution of public officials and police. With Maslow's framework as a lens it is clear to see that the continued attacks on physiological and safety needs reduced the legitimacy of the Iraqi government. The infrastructure collapse highlights a simple fact about this asymmetric warfare: it attacks the people's basic needs to create instability and fear. The lack of U.S. focus in this regard provided insurgency the simple strategy of targeting the basic needs and creating random havoc. If basic needs are not met first then they can become the true roots of insurgency and targets of insurgent opportunity.

## RECOMMENDATION

The relationship between the U.S. and Iraq can be categorized as strained and unpredictable. As the U.S. Army's 3d Infantry Division marched into Baghdad, there were on-going stability operations occurring simultaneously in Nasiriyah, Umm Qasr, and Basra, to name a few. Military means achieved the adoption of democracy through the ways of combat operations; however they fell short of winning the hearts and minds campaign. The lack of planning for the needs of the people, in conjunction with security, can easily become the Achilles heel during post war reconstruction efforts.

Clausewitz states that war is an instrument of policy and as such must bear the character of the policy and measure success by its standards. The conduct of war is the policy itself and the pen of the policy ultimately becomes the sword of war.<sup>37</sup> Creating policy for the success of phase IV operations and nation building to include the concept (way) of analysis through Maslow is paramount. The current environment in Iraq is proof that we can do better at planning. "If the policy is right—that is, successful—any intentional effect it has on the conduct of war can only be to the good. It has the opposite effect if the policy itself is wrong."<sup>38</sup>

This recommendation is definitely worthy of Joint Staff review. Because the National Security Appraisal must have alternatives to properly execute the ends-ways-means paradigm, an analysis of the country to be invaded should be conducted by applying the concept of Maslow's hierarchy of needs framework in both pre and post-war planning efforts. If the U.S. military strategy for phase IV operations includes the identification of the peoples' basic or survival needs first, it can better succeed in providing the commensurate security. This concept can also benefit intelligence planning for strategic bombing so as not to destroy the basic infrastructure that already exists in country.

The current U.S. Strategy to rid the world of terrorism is unmatched in history. The full implication of the strategy is to rid the world of political oppression. If not for the abundant supply of oil and gas resources, economic, political, and cultural exchange between the capitalist world and the Muslim Middle East would not exist.<sup>39</sup> A better and more sustainable strategy is needed. The Cold War philosophies of war dominated by conventional war are no match for asymmetric warfare and terrorism. The strategy must include more than the fearsome capabilities of military power as it did on many battlefields, it should factor in that the wealth of the oil rich Middle East rests in the hands of the aristocracy. The oppressed and poor have basic needs that must be addressed. The way in which the insurgent will operate will be on the distorted cusp of religion. The needs we do not evaluate in pre-planning through a lens as basic as Maslow will become the cultivated bed in which jihadists will root themselves because,



Unlike our conventional uniformed adversaries of the past, the fanatical Jihadist we fight today owe allegiance to no flag, no central leader, and are without a central doctrine or discernable organization. Our enemy lurks, recruits, and nourishes himself in the shadows. He lives in caves, in sprawling urban centers of destitute and decayed states, and among innocent women and children. The toxic urban slums offer the perfect cover and concealment despite all our ultra sophisticated weaponry and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance arrays. Religious-based low-intensity land warfare is predominant now and into the near future.<sup>40</sup>

## **CONCLUSION**

As Saddam Hussein and other dictators have found out, the United States can project power to any corner of the earth. There appears to be less efficiency with nation building. Construction is more difficult than destruction. Nation building operations have proven to be long, costly, and to date U.S. forces in Iraq have suffered more casualties since the end of major military operations than during initial operations.<sup>41</sup> This has also proven to be true in Bosnia, and Afghanistan. If the ultimate goal is to create a policy that provides guidelines to establish self-sustaining countries that are friendly to the U.S., then the NMS must be adapted to do this better to ultimately win the hearts and minds campaign. Nation building and peacekeeping cannot be separate diplomatic efforts. We must use the military assets effectively because most human interactions that happen during the rebuilding process are between members of the armed forces and the local community.<sup>42</sup> It is important to incorporate this “way” of understanding the basic needs of the people, to better optimize these efforts. “Not many people wake up in the morning and say, my culture and I are worthless and insignificant. People need to respect themselves, especially in uncertain times.”<sup>43</sup>

This “way” or concept can bridge the gap between NMS goals (ends) and limited resources, as well as between the military and the dollars that support these efforts. The Maslow planning concept can bring a positive change to the battlefield and offer a better opportunity for success. If executed properly, the U.S. will succeed in achieving the objective of winning the hearts and minds as well as gaining new coalition partners, and lessening or eliminating insurgency. This “way” can also create the conditions for a quick and complete stability effort and as we build long term partnerships and strategic footprints in these new democracies. In any case, a plan that considers the framework of Maslow will better sustain policy ends-ways-means.

WORD COUNT=4898



## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup> Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, edited by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton University Press, 1984), 111.

<sup>2</sup> Richard B. Myers, *National Military Strategy of the United States of America*, (Washington DC: The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2004), 29.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., 13.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., 23.

<sup>5</sup> Michael E. O'Hanlon, "Iraq Without a Plan," December 2004; available from <<http://policyreview.org/dec04/ohanlon.print.html>>; Internet; accessed 17 March 2005.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

<sup>7</sup> Bobby R. Inman et al, "Lessons from the Gulf War," *Parameters* 15 (Winter 1992): 63.

<sup>8</sup> "U.S. Army War College Guidelines for Strategic Formulation", *U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Policy and Strategy*, edited by J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr., July 2004, Appendix I.

<sup>9</sup> Hanlon, 5.

<sup>10</sup> Nadia Schadlow, "War and the Art of Governance," *Parameters* 33 (Autumn 2003): 85.

<sup>11</sup> Kevin Whitelaw, "The Quiet Iraqis," *U.S. News & World Report*, 27 October 2003, 20.

<sup>12</sup> Ideas in this paragraph are based on personal experience in the performance of duties as Chief of Contracts, Tallil Air Base, An Nasiriyah, Iraq under CJTF-7 during OIF I and II.

<sup>13</sup> Whitelaw, 21.

<sup>14</sup> Mark Cancian, "Let's Get Serious About Stability Operations," *Proceedings* (December 2004): 32.

<sup>15</sup> Norman Friedman, *Terrorism, Afghanistan, and America's New Way of War* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2003) 96.

<sup>16</sup> Cancian, 32.

<sup>17</sup> Jason J. Morrisette and Douglas A. Borer, "Where Oil and Water Do Mix: Environmental Scarcity and the Future Conflict in the Middle East and North Africa," *Parameters* 4 (Winter 2004-2005): 88.

<sup>18</sup> World Bank Web site of development indicators, "Country data tables, Iraq," 2004; available from <<http://devdata.worldbank.org/external>>; Internet; accessed 17 March 2005.

<sup>19</sup> Kenneth M. Pollack, "After Saddam: Assessing the Reconstruction of Iraq," 12 January 2004; available from <<http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20040109faupdate83175/kenneth-m->

pollack/after-saddam-assessing-the-reconstruction-of-iraq.html>; Internet; accessed 17 March 2005.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid.

<sup>21</sup> Robert R. Tomes, "Relearning Counterinsurgency Warfare," *Parameters* 34 (Spring 2004): 16-17.

<sup>22</sup> Cancian, 34-35.

<sup>23</sup> William Flavin, "Planning for Conflict Termination and Post-Conflict Success," *Parameters* 33 (Autumn 2003): 97.

<sup>24</sup> Abraham H. Maslow, *Motivation and Personality*, (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), 97-104.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid., 35.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid., 97-104.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid., 149.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid., 40.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid., 97.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid., 265.

<sup>31</sup> Academic Resources Center, Inc. Web site, "Academic research papers," 2005; available from <<http://www.academon.com/lib/essay?KEYW-Modern+use+of+maslow>>; Internet; accessed 17 March 2005.

<sup>32</sup> James Fallows, "Blind Into Baghdad," January/February 2004; available from <<http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/prem/200401/fallows>>; Internet; accessed 17 March 2005.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid.

<sup>35</sup> Ideas in this paragraph are based on personal experience in the performance of duties as Chief of Contracts, Tallil Air Base, An Nasiriyah, Iraq under CJTF-7 during OIF I and II.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid.

<sup>37</sup> Clausewitz, 610.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid.

<sup>39</sup> Paul H. Marx, "Barbarians at the Gate," *Proceedings* (May 2004): 32.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid.

<sup>41</sup> George E. Anderson III, "Winning the Nation building War," Sept-Oct 2004; available from <<http://www.leavenworth.army.mil/milrev/download/English/SepOct04/anderson.pdf>> ; Internet; accessed 17 March 2005.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid.



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